EMPLOYEE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
IN EMPLOYER INTERVIEWS:
WEINGARTEN AND PROGENY
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I. INTRODUCTION

Although endeavoring in large part to ensure a smooth and uncomplicated system of industrial relations, the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Weingarten' failed to adequately protect the rights of the
working force. 2 The shortcomings of Weingarten have been compounded over the years by decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) and the courts. 3 While these bodies generally purport to balance employer and employee rights, 4 their efforts
have, in fact, significantly limited the effectiveness of the employee's
right to union representation at employer-employee interviews.
The employee's guarantee of a union representative's assistance
during an interview which the employee reasonably believes will
result in disciplinary action 5 is undermined by the fact that the guarantee does not apply where a pre-determined decision to discipline the
employee is made and the interview is simply used to announce that
fact. 6 Additionally, if the employee chooses to exercise his or her

* B.A., Connecticut College: J.D., Hofstra University: LL.M. (Labor Law), New York
University; Associate, Murtha, Cullina, Richter & Pinney, Hartford, Connecticut.
420 U.S. 251 (1975).
Six months after Weingarten, Professor Wallace Nelson expressed the same concern
postulating that the Weingarten decision may represent only a Pyrrhic victory. See Nelson,
Epilog: The Right to Union Representation During Management Investigation of Alleged Rule
Infraction, 26 LAB. L.J. 594 (1973); text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
- See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981) (union may waive
employee's Weingarten rights in collective bargaining contract); AAA Equipment Serv. Co. v.
NLRB, 598 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1979) (no right to assistance of union representative where mere
threat of discipline); Mount Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977) (ship
captain's insistence upon seaman's attendance at logging without presence of union representative not unfair labor practice); Stewart-Warner Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 16 (1980) (employer
not guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to allow employee union representation in meeting
with supervisors since reasonable person would have viewed meeting as effort to clarify employee duties); Meharry Medical College, 236 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1978) (telephonic advice from
union's attorney amounted to adequate representation). See discussion in Part III inJra.
4 See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261-62; section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act. 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
5 420 U.S. at 256-60; see notes 8-10 infra and accompanying text.
8 See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 411 (9th Cir. 1978): Baton Rouge
Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 161 slip op. at 7 (Dec. 14, 1979); text accompanying notes
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Weingarten right to union representation, the employer may refuse to
conduct the interview altogether, thereby denying the employee the

right to be heard during an investigation which may result in discipli7
nary action.
This Article will comment on these and other contradictions and
inadequacies of the so-called "representation right"-a right which
our decision-making bodies have only haphazardly endeavored to
afford the members of the labor force.

II. NLRB v.

WEINGARTEN

The seminal case in the area of employee representation rights
during meetings with employers is Weingarten.8

In that case, the

Supreme Court held that section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act 9 grants an employee the right to the assistance of a union representative during an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action.' 0 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court found that this right of representation was

inherent within section 7's guarantee of employee freedom to "engage
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or
protection.""
Extending section 7 to the interview context not only guarded the
individual employee's job interests in the potentially coercive setting
of a one-on-one employer interview,' 2 but also protected the entire

29-34 infra. See generally Brodie, Union Representation and the DisciplinaryIntervicw'. 15 B.C.
INDtS. & Cost. L. REv. 1 (1973).
420 U.S. at 2.58; see text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
In Weingarten, the employer operated a chain of retail stores. The employee, Laura
Collins, worked at a lunch counter located within one of the stores. Acting upon a security
investigator's report that Collins was stealing money from the cash register, the store manager
summoned Collins to an interview. Several times during questioning, Collins "asked the store
manager to call the union shop steward or some other representative to the interview.' 420 U.S.
at 2.54. 11er requests, however, were denied. No disciplinary action was ever taken against
Collins by management; yet after the shop steward learned of the incident, an unfair labor
practice proceeding was commenced by Collins' union. Id. at 254-56.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
'u 420 U.S. at 256-60. This right had previously been recognized by the NLRB, but the
United States courts of appeals had refused to enforce the Board's implementation orders, See.
1973). The right was finally recognized by the Supreme Court in Weingarten and its companion
case, Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 296 (1975). In Weingarten, the Court
found that because the employer interfered with the employee's section 7 rights, a section
8(a)(1). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), violation was perpetrated. 420 U.S. at 264; see note 22
infra.
420 U.S. at 260 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
I at 260, 262. As the Court stated:
Id.
[t]he [National Labor Relations Act] is designed to eliminate the "inequality of
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bargaining unit from the imposition of unjust punishment by an
employer.13 Moreover, in the case of a "fearful and inarticulate"
employee, the presence of a "knowledgeable union representative"
could save the employer production time by facilitating the disclosure
of facts relevant to the "incident occasioning the interview." 4
The Court did, however, recognize that this right was subject to
certain limitations previously defined by the NLRB.' 5 First, the right
only arises in situations where the employee requests representation. 16 "In other words, the employee may forego his guaranteed
right and, if he prefers, participate in an interview unaccompanied by
his union representative."' 7 Second, the employee may only demand
union representation as a condition of participation in an interview
"'where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result
in disciplinary action."' 8 Third, the "exercise of the right may not
interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives."' 9 Thus, the employer is not obligated to conduct the interview after the employee
requests union representation. 20 Finally, the employer is not required
"to bargain with any union representative.
''
gatory interview. 2

. .

attending the investi-

The third limitation imposed on the representation right is the
most disturbing. While it is clear from Weingarten that an employer
is guilty of an unfair labor practice2 2 if he denies the employee's
request for union representation and proceeds with the interview, 23 no
violation will be found if the employer honors the request but then

bargaining power between employees . . . and employers." Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes may result
in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to

eliminate, and bars recourse to the safeguards the Act provided "to redress the
perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management."
Id. at 262 (citations omitted); see Note, Union Representation at Investigatory Interviews: The

Subsequent Development of Weingarten, 28 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 127, 128 (1979).
13420 U.S. at 260-61.
11 Id. at 263.

15Id. at 256 (citing Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B, 197 (1972), and Mobil Oil Corp., 196
N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972)).
11 Id. at 257.
17 Id.

Id. (footnote omitted).
' Id. at 258.

18

o Id. at 258-59.
2' Id. at 259.
22 Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that "[ilt
shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976); see note 10 supra.
23 420 U.S. at 258; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
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refuses to interview the employee on the basis of "employer prerogatives." 1 4 This limitation could arguably be used by the employer as a

means of forcing the employee to choose between seeking union representation and thus foregoing any benefits that might derive from an
interview or waiving his request for representation and proceeding to
the interview without union assistance. In the first instance, the employer would be free to make his own investigation based on potentially erroneous secondhand facts and hearsay; in the latter case, the
employee would be subjected to the same pressures which Weingarten
attempted to remedy. The net result then tends to detract from the
effectiveness of the very right secured by Weingarten.
III. POST-WEINGARTEN

DEVELOPMENTS

A. Baton Rouge Water Works: Disciplinaryv. Investigatory Meetings

The Weingarten decision appears only to have addressed the
issue whether section 7 granted a right of union representation in the
context of investigatory interviews. 25 In Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.,28 the Board extended Weingarten to include disciplinary

interviews, finding that there is the same necessity for representation
at an interview held merely to inform the employee of a pre-determined disciplinary decision as there is at an interview conducted to
elicit facts pertaining to the employee's conduct. 27 The Board indicated that what it deemed important was whether the employee
reasonably believed that the interview might result in disciplinary
action, not whether the interview was labelled disciplinary or investi28
gatory.

21420 U.S. at 258. In an apparent attempt to explain this anomaly, the Court in Weingarten
deferred to the Board's finding that:
'This seems to us to be the only course consistent with all of the provisions of our Act.
It permits the employer to reject a collective course in situations such as investigative
interviews where a collective course is not required but protects the employee's right
to protection by his chosen agents. Participation in the interview is then voluntary,
and, if the employee has reasonable ground to fear that the interview will adversely
affect his continued employment .

. . ,

he may choose to forego it unless he is

afforded the safeguard of his representative's presence. He would then also forego
whatever benefit might come from the interview. And, in that event, the employer
would, of course, be free to act on the basis of whatever information he had and
without such additional facts, as might have been gleaned through the interview.'
420 U.S. at 259 (quoting Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198-99 (1972)).
" See 420 U.S. at 252, 262, 264, 267; note 8 supra.
26227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
27Id. at 1214.
28 Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied enforcement
of the Board's decision in Certified Grocers,2 9 citing its earlier decision
in Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB. 30 The Lewis case provided that
Weingarten should not be read to require a right of representation
when the interview is simply to inform the employee that he is being
disciplined. 3' According to the court, that right does not arise unless
one purpose of the interview is to obtain facts to support disciplinary
32
action that is probable or that is being seriously considered.
The position of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was recently
adopted by the Board in Baton Rouge Water Works, 33 which expressly
overruled Certified Grocers to the extent that the Board now holds:
[U]nder the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten an employee
has no section 7 right to the presence of his union representative at
a meeting with the employer held solely for the purpose of informing the employee of, and acting upon, a previously made discipli34
nary decision.
While the Board made clear that its holding was to apply only in
instances where the employer had reached a "final" disciplinary decision "prior to the interview,' 35 this qualification adds little protection
to employee rights in view of the problems posed by the Board's
position. Most troublesome is the fact that denial of an employee's
211587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
3 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
31 Id. at 411.
32 Id. at 410.
33 246 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (Dec. 14, 1979).
Id., slip op. at 7.
3s Id. at 8. From a practical standpoint the distinction between disciplinary and investigatory interviews may be difficult to sustain. See Spitzer, Labor Relations Law, 22 B.C. L. RrV.
53, 60 (1980). It is unrealistic to assume that a purely disciplinary interview will always remain
so. Normally, an employee faced with the threat of disciplinary action will attempt to defend his
actions. The employer, seeking to further investigate the facts of the incident. may respond with
specific inquiries. At some point this exchange of dialogue will take on the character of an
investigatory meeting. In this instance, the same problems sought to be alleviated by Weingarten
could re-emerge.
While it has been held that an employee's right to representation in a disciplinary meeting
re-attaches where the employer initiates a critique of the employee's work, see Texaco, Inc., 246
N.L.R.B. No. 164 (1977), it is questionable whether most employees will be aware of this right.
Moreover, even assuming that a representative is requested, if the employer refuses and later
maintains that the employee never made the request, there will be no one to corroborate the
employee's version of the incident. Once again, the employee's job interests may not be fairly
represented. To avoid arbitrary distinctions and evidentiary problems, it has been suggested that
the courts return to the question raised in Weingarten: "'Isthis meeting one that the employee
reasonably believes could result in discipline?" Comment, The Repercussionsof Weingarten: An
Employee's Right to Representation at Investigatory Interviews, 64 MARQ. L. Rev. 173, 181-82
(1980).
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right to union representation at purely disciplinary meetings curtails
the bargaining unit's section 7 right to engage in "concerted activity"

for "mutual aid and protection." 36 The presence of a union representative at a disciplinary interview provides insight into management
policies and allows the bargaining unit to remain apprised of employer expectations. 37 If the union is unable to educate itself as to
management attitudes, reasons for discipline may not be accurately
assessed and further disciplinary action may be taken, thereby jeop38
ardizing job security.

The Supreme Court in Weingarten did not intend to restrict an
employee's right to union representation at disciplinary interviews.

Rather, the Court's goal was to extend the representation right to all
interviews which the employee reasonably fears will result in disciplinary action. Board decisions prior to Weingarten had clearly established the right to union representation during disciplinary meetings. 39 The majority opinion in Weingarten specifically referred to
these decisions as "imposing a mandatory affirmative obligation to
meet with the union representative. . . in the case of the disciplinary
interview." 4 0 Indeed, as Member Penello suggested in a vigorous
See note 9 .supra.
See Spitzer, supra note 35, at 59.
As one commentator pointed out:
[A]n employee who is being disciplined might not understand fully the evaluation of
his work that takes place at the disciplinary meeting. When he resumes work he
might be subjected to additional discipline simply because he has not understood
completely the employer's evaluation. The presence of a union representative at a
disciplinary meeting where the employee's work is discussed could help all the
employees better understand why the discipline is being imposed.
Id.. While the employee could still avail himself of union representation during a post-interview
grievance procedure, such a course would be both costly and time consuming. See Comment,
Union Presence in DisciplinaryMeetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 329, 344 (1974). Moreover, the
grievance procedure would not necessarily provide the same insight into employer expectations
as would the "informal exchange between employer and employee" during the disciplinary
meeting. See Spitzer. supra note 35, at 59.
It should also be noted that under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1976), either part)' to a collective bargaining agreement can bring suit in federal
district court for breach of contract. As a prerequisite to such action, however, it is generally
required that a party exhaust contractual remedies under the collective bargaining agreement.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). In most
cases, resort must first be made to the grievance procedure, a traditional avenue of relief
normally provided for in collective bargaining agreements. See generally Gemrich, The Grievance Procedure in the Administration of Collective BargainingAgreements, in SYmrosiusm ON
LAnon RELATIONs 293, 301 (R. Slevenko ed. 1961).
"' See, e.g., Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168
N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
40 420 U.S. at 260 (citing Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil
Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361
(1967)).
"
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dissent in Baton Rouge, the pre-existing right to union representation
at disciplinary meetings "formed the foundation for the section 7
rights established by the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten. - 41
The NLRB, by adopting the view held by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Lewis, has misconstrued the Court's holding in
Weingarten. An employee who is summoned by an employer for the
express purpose of being disciplined, nevertheless may have a reasonable fear prior to the actual interview that this interview will result in
disciplinary action. Accordingly, upon learning that his fear has been
confirmed, the employee should be granted a union representative if
so desired. To allow otherwise contradicts Weingarten and prior decisions, and undermines employees' section 7 rights.
B. Amax, Inc.: Pre-interview Consultations
In Amax, Inc. (Climax Molybdenum Co.), 42 the NLRB was faced
with the issue whether Weingarten also grants employees a right to
consult with a union representative prior to the interview. 43 The
Amax Board found that an employer did in fact interfere with an
employee's section 7 rights by preventing a union representative from
consulting with two employees before an investigatory interview
which the employees believed would result in disciplinary action. 44
In support of its position, the Board determined that under the
Weingarten rationale if a union representative is to be an effective
advocate for a "fearful or inarticulate" employee and "is to be 'knowledgeable' so that he can 'assist the employer by eliciting

. . .

facts,' "

he should be allowed "to consult beforehand with the employee to
246 N.L.R.B. No. 161 at 20.
227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977), enforcement denied. 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
41 Id. at 1190. The Board and the Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit took
different views of
the salient issue in the case. The Board perceived the question to be whether the employee had
the right "to confer with the union representative before the interview." Id. On the other hand,
the Tenth Circuit articulated the issue as whether a union representativehas a right to meet with
employees prior to the "'initial investigatory meeting." Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB. 584
F.2d 360, 362 (10th Cir. 1978).
The difference in view is attributable to the factual setting of the case. Two Climax
employees had been involved in "an altercation" during working hours. When their supervisor
learned of the incident, he advised them 17 1/2 hours in advance that an investigatory meeting
would be held. The employees' union was also informed by the supervisor. Id. at 361. Neither
employee requested union assistance for the interview. Prior to the meeting, a union repiesentative requested that he be permitted to meet with the employees "on company time prior to the
interview." Id. The request was denied by management. Id.
No disciplinary action was ever taken against either employee. An unfair labor practice
action was nonetheless brought by the employees' union "charging that Climax had unlawfully
threatened [the employees] with reprisals because of their involvement in protected concerted
activity." Id. at 362.
11 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
41
42
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learn his version of the events and to gain a familiarity with the
facts." 45 To preclude "such advance discussion" would place

"blinders" on the representative during the interview since there
would be no opportunity to become adequately familiar with the
subject matter of the interview. 46 As such, the Board was convinced
that "[t]he right to representation clearly embrace[d] the right to prior
7

consultation.

4

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit4 8 was less certain of
this "embraced" right of prior consultation and, consequently, denied
enforcement of the Board's decision in Amax. 49 In the court's view,
Weingarten did not mandate an absolute right to prior consultations;
rather, it only required that an employee be afforded an "adequate
opportunity" to meet with his representative before the interview.5 0

The court did not, however, provide any guidelines for determining
what constituted an "adequate opportunity." 51 More importantly, in
refusing to read Weingarten as requiring a right to prior consultation,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to recognize specific goals

which formed the basis of Weingarten.
In establishing a right to representation during employer interviews, the Supreme Court found that both employer and employee
could derive some benefit from such a right. An employee subjected to
employer interrogation "may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate
accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise

15 Id.; see notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
46 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
47 Id.
" Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978). Taking part in the
decision were Circuit Judges McWilliams, Barrett and McKay.
19 Id. at 365.
50 Id. Specifically, the court held:
The employer is under no obligation to accord the employee subject to an investigatory interview with consultation with his union representatives on company time if
the interview date otherwise provides the employee adequate opportunity to consult
with union representatives on his own time prior to the interview. Thus, we do
believe that Weingarten requires that the employer set investigatory interviews at
such a future time and place that the employee will be provided the opportunity to
consult with his representative in advance thereof on his own time.
Id. The court announced this holding at the end of the case. Earlier, however, the court had
stated that Weingarten cannot be interpreted "'so broadly" as to include "pre-interview situations." Id. at 363. Apparently, the court meant to say that there was no violation of Weingarten
rights in this case since the employees had not actually requested union assistance. Id. at 363.
51 In the court's view, the 17 112 hour time lapse between the time the employees were
notified of the meeting and the time it took place was "adequate opportunity" to consult with
their union representative "on their own time." Id.
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extenuating factors." 52 Only if the representative is sufficiently apprised of the "incident" and "extenuating factors" will the "fearful or
inarticulate" employee's job interests be effectively protected. 3 Without prior disclosure of relevant information the representative's role
will be significantly reduced.
As the Supreme Court noted in Weingarten, the presence of a
"knowledgeable" union representative can also assist the employer in
"getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview." ' 54 If
an employee has not consulted with his representative and is personally unable to convey the circumstances surrounding the incident, the
interview will be of little value to the employer. On the other hand, if
the employee has previously consulted with his union representative,
the representative may help to expedite the interview process either by
providing actual information or by lending a sense of security to the
employee. In this way, the employer will not be subjected to unnecessary inconvenience and delay and the stated goals of Weingarten will
be furthered.
C. Roadway Express, Inc.: Accrual of the Right
Another recent decision addressing the question of when an employee's right to representation accrues is Roadway Express, Inc.55 In
that case, a dock employee accused of having advanced threats against
his supervisor was requested by the supervisor to accompany him to
an office in the dock area. 56 The employee refused, insisting that he
would only submit to an interview if he could be accompanied by his
shop steward who was due to arrive in four hours.57 The supervisor
left the dock area but later returned and repeated his request that the
employee meet with him in his office. 58 When the employee again
refused, he was ordered to leave the dock. In addition to this "partday suspension," the employee received a written warning for "flagrant disobeying of orders." 5 9
An unfair labor practice charge was subsequently filed against
the employer alleging that the employee had been disciplined for

52 420 U.S. at 263; see notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.

See Amax, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
420 U.S. at 263.
s' 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979).

Id.
I8
7 Id. The employee, Drake, was a member of the night shift. The shop steward was due to
arrive "'at the commencement of the day shift." Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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invoking his Weingarten rights.6 0 As a preliminary matter, the Board
held that an employee's Weingarten rights mature "at the commencement of the interview," whether that interview commences "on the
production floor or in a supervisor's office." 0 ' Additionally, the
Board found that the employee had properly invoked these rights

when initially confronted by his supervisor.62 Curiously, however,
the Board determined that the supervisor was not guilty of an unfair
labor practice when he suspended the employee for four hours follow63
ing his second request that the employee submit to an interview.

Although the employee had a right to refuse to participate in the
interview absent union assistance, he had no right to ignore the supervisor's order to accompany him to a nearby office.6 4
The Board's conclusion in Roadway Express is confusing and
leaves room for varying interpretations. The Board's finding that the
employee had properly invoked his Weingarten rights on the dock
suggests that the interview had begun at that point. 65 Nonetheless, it
was determined that the employee acted at "his or her peril" in
refusing to agree to leave the dock and accompany the supervisor to
60
his office.
In justification of its position, the Board found that Weingarten
cannot be read to "undermine" an employer's "right to maintain
discipline and order." 67 The facts of the case, however, did not

clearly establish that the employee's presence on the dock area posed a

Id.
' Id. at 1128.

6 Id. As such, the majority found that the supervisor could not have required the employee
to proceed with the interview in the absence of a union representative's assistance. Id. at 1129.
1, Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1129. Specifically, the Board stated:
If the employer . . . asks the employee to leave the production area and go to an

office or some other location where further discussion is contemplated, then the
employee acts at his or her peril if he or she declines to do so. Accordingly, we find
that while Drake was entitled to refuse to participate in an investigatory interview in
the absence of the requested representative, he was not privileged to ignore Respondent's order to leave the dock area.
Id. at 1128-29. This would seem to suggest that an employee must first honor an employer's
order to move to another location before invoking his Weingarten rights. Yet, the Board
specifically held that "an employee's Weingarten rights. . . mature at the commencement of the
interview, be it on the production floor or in a supervisor's office." Id. at 1128. More importantly, it was found that in Roadway Exprss the employee had "properly invoked his Weingarten rights" when first confronted by his supervisor on the dock. Why, then, would the employee
be required to go to his supervisor's office to re-invoke those rights?
o' See note 64 supra.
i, 246 N.L.R.B. at 1128.
7 d.
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threat to the employer's business. To the contrary, the employee had
apparently resumed his duties after initially refusing to submit to the
interview.6 8 If the employee's presence on the dock did in fact pose a
threat to the employer's business, it is curious that the supervisor did
not order the employee off the dock immediately after his refusal to
submit to an interview. Instead, he did so only upon returning and
making a second request. The clear inference is that the supervisor
was really punishing the employee for refusing to be questioned without the presence of his union steward. As Chairman Fanning pointed
out in his dissent, the supervisor "admitted [the employee] was ordered off the premises . . . because he disobeyed [his supervisor's]
order to go with him to the office." 6 9 Consequently, disciplinary
action was taken "precisely because he refused to' 70submit to the interview in the absence of the requested assistance."
The Board has previously held that once a valid request for
representation is made, "the burden is on the employer to either (1)
grant the request; (2) discontinue the interview; or (3) offer the employee the choice between continuing the interview unaccompanied
by a union representative or having no interview at all." 71 The
Board's ruling in Roadway Express entirely ignores this precedent and
in so doing provides a mechanism whereby employers can sanction
non-consenting employees under the guise Of "maintaining discipline
and order," when, as in Roadway Express, the threat to business is
tenuous.

72

D. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.: Choosing a Representative
The NLRB has adopted a seemingly inflexible rule regarding the
right of employees to choose their own representatives for employeremployee interviews. Stated in its simplest form, an employee has a
right to the presence of a union representative but has no right to
request a specific individual. 73 It is the manner in which this rule has
been applied and not the rule itself which is most troublesome.
The Board's position that an employer does not interfere with
section 7 rights by conducting an employee interview in the presence

68 Id. at 1131 (Fanning, Chairman, & Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
69 Id. (emphasis omitted).
10 Id. at 1132 (Fanning, Chairman, & Jenkins, Member, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Indeed, the Administrative Law Judge had made a similar finding. Id.
71 General Electric Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 479, 481 (1979).
7? But see note 38 supra.
,3 See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977); THE BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 5 (Supp. 1976).
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of a non-requested union representative is admittedly sensible in the
context of facts similar to those in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 74 In that
case, the requested representative could not be available for at least
three days.75 To decide the case otherwise would afford employees
an undue advantage. They could regularly request the assistance of
unavailable union representatives thereby postponing their interviews
and interfering with "legitimate employer prerogatives. ' 76 The potential for abuse is so great that the Board's narrow reading of the
Weingarten decision in that context is easily justifiable.
Unfortunately, the Board's recent holding in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,77 is not as easily justified. While in Coca-Cola Bottling it was
clear that the requested representative could not be available for at
least three days, in Pacific Gas the representative could have been
.present within twenty to sixty minutes. 78 In Pacific Gas, the employer operated two facilities within twenty minutes of each other
and the union had assigned two stewards to each location.7 9 The
Board held that where union representation is available at a given
location, the employer does not violate an employee's section 7 rights
by denying a request for a specific union representative at a different
location.80
The Board arrived at its conclusion despite the protestations of
dissenting Member Jenkins who pointed out that:
Sell [the shop steward] was a personal friend of the management
personnel involved in the dispute, was under consideration for a
management position with Respondent, and several days earlier
had told Green [the affected employee] that because he [Sell] was
being considered for that position, he "did not want to get involved
in a controversial issue.""'
Contrary to the majority's assertion that a duly designated union
representative was ready, willing, able, and present,12 it would appear that the representative was neither willing nor able. According
to testimony, the shop steward had indicated an unwillingness to
involve himself in "a controversial issue."' 83 Although it is under7, 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977).
7. Id. at 1276.
76 See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258.
7 253 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (1981).
71 Id. at 1143.
Id.
I0
'0 Id. at 1144.

61 Id.
32 Id.

" Id.

at 1145.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:226

standable that the Board would be hesitant to "complicate the already
complex scheme" of representation at investigatory interviews, 84 individual employee rights to fair and adequate representation ought not
be sacrificed for the sake of administrative simplicity. 85 The effect of

the Board's holding in Pacific Gas was to force the employee to choose
between accepting a purportedly disinterested representative, proceeding to the interview alone, or foregoing the interview entirely.
On facts such as those presented in Pacific Gas, where a union
representative is incapable of providing able assistance, an employee
should have the right to choose another representative. The Board
need not overrule its decision in Coca-Cola; rather, it should limit the
holding to situations such as that which arose in Coca-Cola. Employees ought not have the right to unduly delay interview proceedings, but they must, if Weingarten is to retain any viability, have the
right to competent, unbiased, willing representation where such representation is reasonably accessible.
E. Materials Research Corp: Employees as Representatives
A rather complex question flowing from the issue of employee
choice of representation is whether an employee, in the absence of
union representation, may request that another employee be present
at the employer interview. This issue is presently pending before the
NLRB on an appeal from a decision of an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) who held that Weingarten ought not be read to require an
employer to grant requests for non-union representation. 8
Materials Research Corp.87 involved a situation in which an

employee in a non-unionized plant was trying to organize a group
meeting to protest a unilateral change in working hours. 88 He was
subjected to questioning and given a warning by his employer for his
organizational activities. 89 During the investigatory interview the
84 Id. at 1144.
85 The duty of fair representation proscribes union conduct which is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." See Hiner v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
Research Corp., No. 2-CA-16385 (Washington, March 10, 1980) (Morton,
8Materials
A.L.J.).
81 No. 2-CA-16385_.(Washington, March 10, 1980) (Morton, A.L.J.).
88 Id., slip op. at 3. The employees in Materials Research worked in the precious metals
department of employer's plant. Each day they were given certain quantities of precious metals
to work with. At the end of the work day, these metals had to be returned to the custodian. In
order to save production time which was being lost as a result of the employees standing in line to
receive and later check the precious metals, the department supervisor instituted a new schedule
which staggered employee hours. Id.
869Id., slip op. at 4. The warning was given for violating company rules by failing "to follow
the company grievance procedure and for organizing that group meeting" on company time. Id.
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employee requested the assistance of a fellow employee. His request
was denied.
The ALJ refused to read Weingarten as guaranteeing an employee's right to the presence of a non-union representative.9 0 Relying upon part of the rationale of Weingarten, he determined that the

co-worker could neither represent the interests of the employee being
disciplined nor the interests of "other unit employees." 9'

In the case

of the individual employee, the co-worker "could not help protect any
rights in an established grievance machinery" since the non-union
employee "had no such rights." 9 2 Furthermore, he could not repre-

sent the interests of other employees since the employees had expressed
an interest to remain unrepresented by their failure to elect union
representation. 9 3 In short,
[Njo useful function is fulfilled by requiring an employer, where its
plant is unrepresented, to have two employees present in an investigation when, in the end, the employer is free to do whatever it
chooses to do and is in no way answerable to a third party [such as]
94
an arbitrator.
The ALJ's decision 9 5 should be reversed by the Board because it

entirely ignores precedent expanding Weingarten to include unorganized employees. For example, in Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 98 an

employee who worked in a unionized plant requested "that a fellow
employee sit with her during a disciplinary interview." 97 The Board
found that the employer interfered with the employee's section 7
rights by refusing the employee's request and proceeding with the
interview. 98 In reaching its conclusion, the Board determined that
' Id., slip op. at 13. Although the Administrative Law Judge did not believe Weingarten
was applicable to an unrepresented unit, he nonetheless found that the employer was guilty of a
section 8(a)(1) violation, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (1976), by conducting coercive interrogation of
employees "as to how and why the organized a group meeting," and by disciplining one
employee "for his activities in organizing and participating in the group meeting." No. 2-CA16385, slip op. at 13.
No. 2-CA-16385, slip op. at 11.
" d.
IId. The ALI believed that to permit the co-worker to attend the meeting and thus
represent the interests of the other employees, "would go directly contrary to their expressed
desire not to be represented." Id.
No. 2-CA-16385, slip op. at 12.
"
An ALJ's decision is often referred to as an "intermediate report." This report contains
"findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended disposition or order." The Board will
endorse the ALJ's intermediate report "as a matter of course" unless exceptions are filed by either
partN'. R. CORMAN, BAsic TEXr ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 8
(1976).
" 2.51 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1980).
" Id. slip op. at 932.
" Id. at 934.
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the emphasis of section 7 and Weingarten was upon the employee's
"right to act concertedly for protection in the face of a threat to job
security, and not upon the right to be represented by a duly designated collective bargaining representative." 9 9
Similarly, in Anchortank, Inc.,'0 0 the NLRB determined that the
representative right existed where a union had been elected but not
yet certified.' 0 ' In the Board's view, the Supreme Court's "primary
concern" in Weingarten was to secure employees "some measure of
protection" when faced with the threat of disciplinary action stemming from a confrontation with an employer.' 0 2 As such, "the status
of the requested representative, whether it be that of union not yet
certified or simply that of fellow employee, does not operate to deprive employees of rights [secured] in section 7." 103
The ALJ's analysis in MaterialsResearch overlooks the fact that a
fellow employee may still provide "aid or protection" to the "fearful
and inarticulate employee." Moreover, the presence of another employee may create a valuable link between employers and employees.
As previously discussed, the presence of a union representative serves
the important purpose of keeping the bargaining unit educated as to
management policies. 04 The lone employee faced with the threat of
disciplinary action may fail to adequately understand the reasons for
the employer's actions. 105 The fellow employee, whether or not union affiliated, may nonetheless be in a position to provide the employees with information important to job interests. More harmonious
labor relations will be advanced since employees will understand
what is expected of them.
IV. CONCLUSION

The section 7 right of employees to the assistance of a representative at employer-employee interviews is central to our system of
industrial discipline. It was precisely that right which formed the

" Id. at 933. The Board also noted that its holding would prescribe "no conflict" between
the section 7 right to representation and the union's status as exclusive bargaining unit since "no
officially designated union representative was available at the time of the interview and there
was no agreement otherwise establishing "a procedure for representation at investigatory interviews." Id. at 934.

M0239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978).
101

Id. at 431.

I02Id.
103 Id.
104

See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.

105 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten. If that right is
to retain any meaning whatsoever, then it must not be further limited
by the Board or the courts.
Employees should have a right to the assistance of a representative at all employer interviews where it is reasonable to fear resultant
discipline. Without such protection, important employee interests are
undermined. In addition, employees should be permitted where practicable to choose their own representatives, union or nonunion, and
they should be permitted prior consultation with those representatives. Only when the Board and the courts begin to so read Weingarten will employees fully enjoy the protective benefits intended by the
Supreme Court.

